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Contract inflexibility seems to stem from two motivations: the urge to control the future, and a quest 
to improve economic efficiency. In thinking about whether and how contract inflexibility might be 
reduced, those human motivations must be taken into account. Reforms aimed at greater flexibility 
might better fit modern economic, organizational, and technological conditions, but if the underlying 







This paper reflects on both the “future control” and “efficiency-seeking” impulses toward 
inflexibility, asking whether modern trends are changing the underlying assumptions of those 
impulses. Then, it examines a novel and still-evolving approach to intellectual property 
licensing—“branded licensing”--that has potentially broad application in transcending these 
motivations toward inflexibility. The branded licensing approach may achieve greater flexibility 
without compromising stability, the need for which prompts the urge to control the future. Branded 
licensing offers this greater flexibility without significantly increasing transaction costs, which 
prompts the concern about efficiency. “Branding” may thus represent a new structure for contracting 
that will be attractive psychologically, as well as legally and economically. Although as yet visible 
only in Intellectual Property licensing—examples of which are presented below—the branding 
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1. Why Are Contracts Traditionally So Inflexible?  
 
1.1. Controlling the Future Through Legal Imperatives 
 
At least in part, people demand inflexibility in contracts because they want to control the 
future. This impulse may sound obsessive, but it is actually sensible. A perceived need for 
“future control” is best understood if we imagine a world without legally enforceable 
contracts. Exchange would proceed only where the performances of both parties are 
immediate—a synchronous transaction as in retail sales or bartering—or where one party is 
trusted to delay performance to some future moment. Absent that trust or some other 
non-contractual leverage like taking property as security against performance, the exchange 
will be too risky to undertake. Further, the greater the turbulence of background market or 
personal considerations, the harder it is to trust the other person. The greater the fluctuation 
of environmental conditions, in other words, the higher the risk of trusting that future 
performances will actually be made. A stable future reduces risk, heightens trust, and enables 
more transactions. If the reality of the future cannot be fully predicted or controlled, then 
creating a future artificially through contracts will supply that needed stability. 
 
Legally enforceable promises—i.e., contracts—are thus a breakthrough in the history of 
human exchange. Even without preexisting trust between the parties, contracts can provide 
the stability on which putting one’s trust in another person’s future performance becomes a 
tolerable risk. Therefore the performances of the contracting parties need not occur 
simultaneously. By bringing the power of the state to bear on future performances, regardless 
of then-prevailing economic or personal conditions, contracts permit the reciprocal duties of 
an exchange to be reliably performed even though asynchronous. The de-coupling in time of 
the performances dramatically increases the potential for parties to find mutually beneficial 
exchanges. It stabilizes transactions over time by smoothing out the effects of market 
fluctuations, permits risks to be more readily calculated, and enables stronger planning and 
confidence in resource allocation. Controlling the future through the law thus facilitates 
interpersonal trust, and the feasibility of contracts. It is natural, therefore, that the 
“future-control” impulse is so strongly felt among the commercial community. The trouble 
lies when that impulse turns into instinctive contractual inflexibility.  
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Safeguarding the reliability of this invention for asynchronous exchange—“contracts”-- no 
doubt explains why early contract law was so restrictive in releasing parties from their 
obligations, even where background conditions had become highly impracticable or 
unprofitable. To gain the benefits of the contract device seemed to require that people be 
clear in what they demanded of their counterparts’ future performances; it also seemed to 
require that contract law be forceful in enforcing the parties’ original intentions. That is 
indeed how contract law classically evolved: excuses from performing as specified were only 
sparingly allowed, and contract language interpretation instinctively circled back to the 
parties’ intentions.  
 
“Flexibility” is not valued in such a conceptualization. Flexibility seems inconsistent, at least 
on the surface, with capturing the efficiencies that flow from ensuring future 
performances--from “controlling the future.” If a contract could reliably specify what shall 
be, then what really is when the time for performance arrives is irrelevant. Contracts are 
designed to define legally what future conditions shall obtain, and the parties should behave 
accordingly. “Flexibility” may seem to undermine that valuable legal suspension from reality. 
 
Modernly, however, the rate of change in markets, organizations, and technology may be 
accelerating so dramatically that “freezing” the future through classical contracting may 
introduce new risks. Where an environment changes constantly, both buyers and sellers may 
begin to perceive flexibility as offering stronger opportunities and perceive commitments as 
threatening stronger risks. One of us has likened this to bridge building in an 
earthquake-prone region. One possible way to overcome the risk of an unpredictably shifting 
environment is to engineer massive inflexible strength into the bridge—often at significant 
cost. Or one can design a bridge that is itself flexible, one that will move with earth tremors 
so that the bridge never loses structural integrity. So also with contracting: in some 
environments (which may be quickly proliferating), designing contracts and contract 
processes to be flexible rather than inflexible may actually reduce risks and increase 
opportunities. Stability may be achieved, in other words, through inflexibility or through 
thoughtful flexibility. Indeed, stability is sometimes better achieved through flexible 
structures and good communications rather than through inflexible demands with expensive 
and often bruising enforcement methods.  
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1.2. Efficiency Through Standardization 
 
The second reason why people may demand inflexibility in their contracts is to better enable 
the standardization of those contracts. Standardization promotes efficiency by reducing the 
time spent on contract drafting. People may want to mass-produce a contract that is optimally 
drafted for the most commonly prevailing conditions. This mentality demands contract 
inflexibility in the form of a standardized agreement that is offered on a take-it-or-leave-it 
basis, a “contract of adhesion.” Deviating from a standardized agreement raises a specter of 
substantially higher transaction costs, and greater liability risks from relatively inexpert or 
unapproved language being inserted into a tried-and-true document.  
 
This inflexibility is more often visible in consumer transactions in which little or no 
bargaining is possible, except perhaps on price or length of warranty. A typical consumer 
contract in electronic and mobile commerce is represented by what is often called 
“Click-through” contracts or licenses.
5
 “Click-through” arrangements for electronic 
transactions differ little in this regard from the insertion of printed warranty terms in the 
packaging of tangible items. Certainly time and lawyer fees are saved by producing and using 
standardized contracts. Inflexibility, again, seems at first blush to be efficient.  
 
Using standardized contracts either in consumer transactions or in business to business 
contexts assumes, however, a hierarchy between the parties. The creator of the contract seems 
to impose its terms on the receiver of the contract, empowered over the other and able to 
harness that power to press the contract terms onto the subordinated party. The source of the 
dominant power could be economic—a stronger market position—or it could be more 
“structural,” reflecting dramatic disparities in sophistication and capability to draft and 
understand contractual language. Regardless of its source, the ability to impose a 
standardized (usually unread) contract onto another party suggests strongly that one party will 
“win” and the other “lose” in the transaction.  
 
In wielding potential legal tools like “unconscionability” or “undue influence” that might 
allow escape from such contracts, courts tend to be cautious. Courts are mindful of the 
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business realities that seem to underlie the use of standardized contracts.
6
 If the only choices 
that appear available are: (1) to uphold standardized contracts even though they seem to make 
a mockery of traditional contract assumptions about bargained-for exchange; or (2) to impose 
a standard in which the parties come to a real “meeting of the minds,” courts typically permit 
the use of standardized contracts because requiring true consent to the terms by both parties 
would seemingly paralyze modern commerce. This issue is of vital concern not only to 
modern commerce, but also to the perception and reality of meaningful participation in that 
exchange. Thankfully, as we develop below, the choices for the law may not be completely 
binary between one-sided standardized contracts, versus unrealistic and hugely expensive 
personalized negotiation.  
 
Emerging alternatives--what we here call “branded” contracts or licensing--are potentially 
more than just compromises or trade-offs between efficiency and justice. We argue that 
branded contracting may introduce a way to make contracting both more efficient and more 
equitable, despite some shortcomings. Just as people should not necessarily equate 
“inflexibility” with “stability,” so also people should not necessarily equate “inflexibility” 
with “efficiency.” We can imagine instances in which greater stability is achieved through 
flexibility, and we can also imagine instances of greater efficiency and equity being achieved 
through flexibility. 
 
Hierarchy and power-imposition are the problem-solving tools of an era that is being replaced 
by a more level and participatory world.
7
 As these cultural trends proceed, we may speculate 
that consumers will eventually rebel against the dis-empowering dictates of standardized 
contracts. They may demand legislation that will regulate various transactions to mandate 
more balanced relationships between vendor and buyer/licensee. Such regulatory solutions, 
however, are quite likely to add to inflexibility, although they may achieve stronger 
distributional fairness. More imaginative private or private/public partnership possibilities 
such as branded licensing could conceivably achieve stronger fairness, even while increasing 
the flexibility in contracting that better serves modern businesses and organizations. The next 
section introduces both the idea, and the cultural underpinnings, of this branded approach.  
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2. Intellectual Property and Contracts: Parallels 
 
2.1. Background: The Culture of Collaboration versus Culture of Permission 
 
As Intellectual Property law has evolved alongside information technology, ideas about the 
preconditions for creativity and innovation seem to diverge in contradictory directions: 
toward a culture of “collaboration,” or a culture of “permission.” “Collaboration” emphasizes 
free exchange and open communication under a foundational metaphor of the “commons” in 
which an entire community shares access to a resource. Individual members of the 
community are free to take from the commons, and are encouraged to contribute to its 
well-being and growth: no one “owns” the commons in the sense of being able to exclude or 
control access. Collaborationist culture emphasizes organic growth through the gathering of 
diverse ideas and resources, like Wikipedia.  
 
“Permission,” by contrast, emphasizes legal entitlements and control of both property and 
information under a foundational metaphor of “enclosure.”
8
 A Permission culture assumes 
that innovation depends on incentives for profits that come from the ability to control and sell 
access to ideas.
9
 In this cultural model, any use of an innovation or creative expression 
would require permission from the right holders. Ideas and creations are protected by 
legally-enforced property rights,. The property title holders may restrict the use of these 
abstract objects and any users may need to seek permissions from the right holders. Only by 
assuring entitlement to such payments for permissive use, claim the advocates of Permission 
culture, will innovators have a proper incentive for investing the time, resources, and mental 
energy required for creativity. 
 
Both Collaborationist and Permissive cultures are defensible, but each is vulnerable when 
taken to an extreme. Collaborationist culture is subject to the “tragedy of the commons,”
10
 
which is a phrase coined by Garret Hardin to describe what is seen as the inevitable depletion 
of resources, where there is no formal owner of a resource, and hence no mechanism for 
limiting access to it. If use of a resource is free, then people will withdraw units of the 
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resource while leaving its replenishment to others. Even if we take into consideration that 
intangible intellectual resources may be non-rivalous, the resources required to create and 
innovate those resources may be rivalous. The tragedy is that unfettered usage in the 
commons property will lead to no resources being available to anyone: most people will 
simply take the free resource and not contribute to its sustainability.  
 
On the other hand, a Permission culture is vulnerable to ossification. Where 
resources—tangible, intellectual, or cultural—are not shared or otherwise distributed, they 
can never grow.
11
 Economic efficiency assumes that resources should flow—by sale or 
otherwise—to their highest and best use. They should move to those who value the resource 
most, presumably because the resource is most productive in their hands. Intellectual 
innovation is similar: unless ideas circulate, they will not thrive or spark the imagination of 
people who would build on the idea. But Permission culture would theoretically permit 
property and ideas to be locked up, under-used and hence become both stagnant and 
inefficient. The exclusive property that a Permission culture presupposes is subject to a 
tragedy of another kind – the tragedy of the anti-commons, where the pervasive exclusion 
leads to under-use or non-use of the protected innovation.
12
 Avoiding inefficient ossification 
is what prompts the law historically to adopt policies in favor of free alienability of property 
and to prohibit the long-term freezing of property. Rules under intellectual property laws that 
grant statutory licenses or compulsory licenses under certain conditions are also examples 




Neither Collaboration nor Permission should therefore be embraced without limitation. 
Society is best served by viewing them not as mutually exclusive, binary opposites, but 
instead as thriving only when used in combination. Innovation and efficiency require a blend 
of Permission and Collaboration, just as social stability is best achieved through a blend of 
rules and flexibility. What appear to be antagonistic modes of human behavior—Permission 
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versus Collaboration--are better viewed as differing but potentially complementary values. 
The trick is to build structures that will enable complementarity: structures that legitimately 
bring together the qualities of rules and flexibility, Permission with Collaboration.  
 
Ironically, building frameworks open to these diverse values may be easier in social 
relationships than in Intellectual Property. In social settings, we are accustomed to a broad 
and informal range of flexibility in the interactional rules that characterize families and 
friendships. Sharing is valued, but so is saying “please” and “thank you.” Intellectual 
Property, by contrast, is a set of abstract legal constructs that the law seems historically to 
have tied strongly to Permission culture and its assumptions.  
 
Intellectual Proprietary Rights (“IPR”) are created by the law, but then also become the 
primary tools by which Permission culture realizes its outlook on the world. IPR takes 
information that flows through the intellectual commons of “knowledge” and “education” 
and encloses some forms of that information into property rights. Access to those rights is 
then controlled through legally-enforced permissions (although the law does sometimes 
require “sharing” through doctrines like “fair use” and “mandatory licensing”). 
Collaborationist culture seems to have no equivalent formal or institutional structure. So 
engrained are we with the idea that resources are protectable only through reducing them to 
property rights, that it becomes difficult even to imagine how a Collaborationist outlook 
could be enforced. Can sharing be mandated? Can generosity be legislated? However elusive 
it may be to build institutional props for Collaboration culture, many creators nonetheless 
view the legal IPR structure as stifling and failing to achieve the balance between control and 
sharing that is optimal for either innovation or distributional justice. 
 
Are the critics correct in that assessment? Does the law overly stress Permission at the 
expense of Collaboration? And if so, how may the law correct it? 
 
Those responding “yes” to the first two questions above may say that by turning to IPR as its 
primary method for defining the relationship between intellectual creator and user, the law 
inherently defaults toward Permission. IPR sets up entitlements for exclusion that must be 
purchased by users. The law could instead have created something like “IAR” (Intellectual 
Access Rights) that defaulted to entitlements for sharing, requiring those who would seek 
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exclusive control to have purchased that right from society generally.
14
 But the law generally 
did not do that. It gave the first entitlement to creators rather than users, perhaps because that 
arrangement fit so easily within pre-existing legal structures, or perhaps out of the same 
instincts or impulses that push toward contract inflexibility: concerns to keep control over 
the future of resources and to protect efficiency.  
 
For whatever reason, IPR evolved along lines of traditional property rights and now stands 
alongside traditional contract law and processes in solidarity with assumptions about the 
value and need for control, predictability, and individualized entitlements. As we discuss 
below the particulars of how branded licensing may introduce better flexibility and 
distribution in Intellectual Property, therefore, we may also imagine its potential broader uses 
in commercial contracting.  
 
 
2.2. Contracts and Licensing as Potential Bridges Between Permission and Collaboration 
  
Suppose that an inventor wanted to overcome the tendencies of IPR toward Permission 
culture. Suppose, in other words, that an inventor wanted to set up a durable Collaborative 
environment regarding his or her invention. That inventor would have to have: (1) models for 
how to share the inventiveness, so as to build a sustainable “commons;” (2) an ability to scale 
that sharing method efficiently throughout the appropriate community; and (3) the methods 
must be accessible, i.e., comprehensible and readily available to both creator and potential 
new user.  
 
IPR--and, pushing the analogy further, traditional contract law--seem to fail all three 
elements. First, IPR and contracts offer little vision for sharing–a normative alternative to the 
neoclassical image of individual wealth-maximizers. Second, both IPR and contracts struggle 
to find a method of scaling-up, apart from using standardized language in mass contracts. In 
IPR settings this takes the form of “click-on” or “click-through” computer-based licensing–a 
method that has proven to be challenging not only in terms of content, but also in perceived 
legitimacy of process. Finally, because managing the ownership and use of legal rights is 
                                                 
14
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complex (perhaps especially so in Intellectual Property) both contracts and licenses tend to be 
inaccessible: they are so difficult to read and understand that few people manage to do either. 
“Branded” IP licensing practices are a reaction to these perceived shortcomings. First, they 
have arisen largely among communities that favor Collaboration rather than Permission. And 
second, they provide an alternative to the traditional poor choices between inefficient, 
individually negotiated agreements and standardized Contracts that remain unread.  
 
Branded licensing practices typically involve the following steps: (1) a community of people 
is constructed who become associated with the “brand” or trademark; (2) the community 
drafts and recommends detailed terms and conditions (or a series of alternative terms, 
depending on the goals and values of the users) for using particular intellectual property; and 
(3) the community uses a sign or trademark as a shorthand for the developed terms and 
conditions that stand in the background behind the brand. By using nothing more than an 
icon, in branded licensing the parties can agree to abide by terms that have been pre-drafted 
by a community of interest, reflecting the values of that community.  
 
At some future point, a creator and users, or buyers and sellers could conceivably be able to 
bargain meaningfully about which “brand” of license or contract would govern their 
transaction. The parties would not necessarily know or understand much about the many 
terms or conditions that may stand in the background of an icon, but they could come to 
know and trust the values behind different organizations. Here is a homely analogy: when 
buying eggs, consumers can choose cartons that say “organic,” “hormone free,” or “free 
range.” Even though the details of the background practices that those words or phrases 
actually represent are not spelled out on the carton, the buyer trusts that these background 
practices are ones that the buyer would endorse. So also in contracting: different persons 
entering an agreement may have strikingly different values or preferences, but each could 
advance those preferences by choosing a “brand” that the particular contractor trusts.
15
 A 
consumer buyer may, for example, may request that a hypothetical “Consumer Reports” 
version of a washing machine purchase be used in the transaction, while the seller could hold 
out for a hypothetical “Chamber of Commerce” version of an agreement. Licensing parties 
could ultimately have a choice among many competing brands concerning software use, for 
                                                 
15
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and packaging.  
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example, with varying degrees of collaboration or control that they promote. We do not know 
which party would prevail in the contest above between using the Consumer Reports, or the 
chamber of Commerce brand. Perhaps the parties would have to agree on a third brand, like a 
hypothetical “Fair Trade” brand; but at least the bargaining would be real.  
 
As things stand now, many contracts are largely dictated by the more powerful party, taking 
the form of a standardized agreement that neither party reads or understands. Even in the 
most mundane and simplified transactions, communication of contract terms is often done 
through textual details.
16
 Branded contracts become drastically simplified in the minds of the 
negotiators, because the “visible” portions of the contract may be reduced to a highly 
symbolic and visual icon plus a few specifics like price, quantity, and delivery dates. All of 
the other terms would be accessible “behind” the icon, probably on the community drafter’s 
website. Hence a real choice could be restored to many transactions that currently lack 
choice. This form of bargaining could be highly efficient, and need not add significant 
transaction costs.  
 
In the sections that follow we describe and offer examples of the growing phenomenon of 
branded licensing, which seems the leading edge of a possible broader branded contract 
innovation. In this description of how branded licensing evolved and now serves the IP 
community, we suggest a categorization among types as “community-based,” 
“drafter-based,” and “industry associations.” We will then analyze the potential dangers as 
well as benefits of the practices of branded licensing.  
 
Tying the paper into the overall topic of flexibility in contracting, we will conclude that 
branded contracting greatly promotes flexibility by giving contract users a range of efficient, 
accessible contracting options based on terms that predictably reflect the values of 
contracting parties--rather than employing either one-size-fits-all standardized agreements, or 
default state legal rules. Branded licensing and branded contracting offer potentials for 
introducing flexibility without sacrificing stability; for preserving efficiency through 
competition, as brands could compete with one another for adoption (and potentially fees); 
and for finding a more equitable distributional balance by reducing somewhat the needed 
sophistication involved in contracting. 
                                                 
16
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3. Branded Licensing of Intellectual Property 
 
3.1. Introduction to Chapter 3  
 
Branded contracting may be on the horizon, inspired in part by the various “community” 
practices among intellectual property creators and licensees as described in this Part III. The 
vision for possible branded contracts outlined above has been largely from the perspective of 
those who use contracts in either consumer or business settings—the potential adopters of a 
particular “brand” of contract. In Part III, by contrast, we describe the history of branded IP 
licensing largely through the eyes of the communities that created the brands. To extend the 
analogy suggested above, we now consider branded agreements from the perspective of those 
who produce and distribute the eggs rather than those who might buy them. Described below 
are examples of how various communities came to define and protect the meaning of labels 
like “free range” and “organic” that appear on the cartons—and even regulate how the eggs 
might be eaten. 
 
Considering the perspectives of both brand creators and brand adopters is essential for 
understanding and assessing the prospects and the potential limitations of branded contracting 
that will be considered in Part IV and the Conclusion of this article. As will become apparent 
below, the communities that have created branded IP licensing are doing far more than 
selling a product. Although they diverge in their origins and motivations, they are creating 
meanings and community identity, and may be furthering a world outlook. As a result, the 
relationship between a drafter and a user of a branded license may be more complex and 





As the complexity of Intellectual Property (“IP”) law has grown, contracts have become 
increasingly important regulators for using, sharing and restricting IP both within and outside 
of the professional creator community. The contents and processes of contracts dealing with 
IP matters have become correspondingly more complex and challenging. Users and creators 
of digital contents must comply with various laws, and permissions must be sought, as 
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preconditions to most creative collaboration. This creates a need for both the users and 
producers to navigate the complexities of licensing terms and laws that are applicable to 
particular transactions. Both “standardized contracts” and “branded” practices arise out of 
this need. Standardized terms are far more common, and may be thought of as precursors to 
the branded approach. Either way, IP law requires that the contracts specify what types of 
actions can and cannot be taken regarding a particular expression, creation, or technological 
idea. Further, the scope of a right provided by IPR laws is not clear until the specific right is 
challenged and litigated in the courts. If one is to draft a contract in a proactive manner, due 
consideration must be given to all types of authorized actions and their combinations.  
 
 
3.3. Standardized Terms, Model Terms and Reputation  
 
Using standardized terms, or a model contract that a professional association recommends, is 
nothing new. Standardized terms have been used often in mass market contexts. Likewise, 
use of model clauses or terms recommended by a certain professional organization is nothing 
new. In many businesses where transactions are repeated, or if both of the contracting parties 
belong to a certain professional organization, starting a contract negotiation based on a model 
terms often saves time and drafting costs for both parties. The relationship of the immediate 
contracting (licensing) parties to the recommending association or community is illustrated 
by Figure 1. 
 
The reputation of the organization that drafts the model or standard terms is essential to 
professional organizations or reputable communities using these terms. With the drafting 
organization’s reputation and goodwill in the background, these practices gradually develop 
into branded contracting practices. Standardized terms provided by some professional 
associations such as the ICC (International Chamber of Commerce) or ORGALIME 
(European Engineering Industries Association) are used voluntarily, based on the reputation 
of the organizations. They may evolve into standardized practice by frequency of use. 
Standardized terms may be promoted by adoption of a template or a model contract that these 
professional associations draft. 
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[Figure1. Standard Terms – Community or Association Based] 
 
 
In other contexts where templates or model contracts are not used, some of the standardized 
terms are promoted through the membership agreement among the members of the 
professional organizations. A good example is the licensing principle based on the FRAND 
(“fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory”) condition in information technology 
standard-setting organizations and the communication technology sector. They may become 
standardized through their voluntary use or mandated through membership. Because of wide 
reaching membership or because of the intended function of an organization as providing 
standardization within an industry, the terms of the agreement that the organization 
recommends can gain informal or formal authority. 
 
3.4. Branded IPR Licensing 
 
In contrast to the recommendations by associations, informal standardization of contract 
terms may occur by more spontaneous paths. A set of terms may simply be perceived as 
efficient by those working in a particular context. If used often enough, these like-minded 
people may create a community of users of such terms. This usage may be formalized 
through creation of a “brand,” or identity-signifying source. They may even be protected 
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Promoting Contract Flexibility through Trademarks 
261 
trust) a third-party community with representing values or outlooks on the world that they 
share, is what enables the possibility of branded contracting, as distinct from standardized 
contracts.  
 
In short, branded IP licensing describes a practice in IPR licensing of digital contents in 
which a mark, sign, word or a symbol is associated with the standard terms or meanings that 
are recommended to be used. It is controlled, in the sense that the terms of use are not drafted 
by the licensor but rather by another party or entity which has proprietary or other interests in 
the propagation of the terms of use. Thus a branded IP licensing seems to be a combination of 
flexibility with efficient standardization.  
 
What sets branded contracting or licensing apart from use of the standardized terms of an 
association is the way in which the terms of the contracts are communicated to the users of 
the contracts – visually, textually and also technically. The parties will use a symbol or 
trademark of a certain “brand” of licensing to communicate core aspects of the contract 
content but also through textual contract terms. The resulting contract need not visually 
include all of the terms that will actually govern their relationship. The content is 
incorporated by an iconic reference—the symbol or trademark of the brand chosen by the 
parties. Importantly, this background content of specific terms or meanings is intended 
legally to govern the relationship. Additionally, contract contents may also be communicated 
through software tools so that the users may implement the terms of contract technically. 
Behind the trademark or icon is a community—a community either created especially for the 
purpose of governing licenses of certain IP, or a community that has arisen for other purposes 
but whose members have taken on the task of generating a set of licensing terms that reflect 
the ideology or values of that community.  
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[Figure 2. A branded IPR license] 
 
As Figure 2 shows, a formal branded licensing often has a two-fold structure. It involves two 
sets of usage and licensing terms: first the standard licensing terms that will govern the IPR 
relationship of the immediately contracting parties, i.e. the users (C2); but secondly, a set of 
terms that regulate the use of the mark and content of the community whose branded 
licensing terms have been employed by those parties, i.e. between drafter community 
organization and the user (C1). Hence, a branded licensing communicates two different types 
of information to the users of the standardized terms: (1) information on the terms and what 
can be expected of and by the parties to the license (C2); and (2) information concerning the 
reputation of the community that is behind the brand that the mark represents (C1). 
Agreement to the specific terms of the contract is dictated by agreeing to the licensing norms 
of the background community.  
 
Furthermore, as Figure 3 below shows, the information on the specific terms that will govern 
the parties is given at two levels – a simplified version represented through iconic reference 
to a mark, and the more complex information representing the contents of the third party 
licensing terms (which may be available only at a third party website, rather than appearing in 
the particular licensing document). As to the reputation of the community behind the brand, 
that is far more general and perhaps under-articulated. But it is nonetheless real: branded 
licensing reflects the values that each “branding” community represents. Just as a contract 
A “Branded” IPR Licensing 
User/ 
Licensor
Trademark Holder/ Community 








Branded Licensing Agreement 
Use of  the “Brand”
Use of Recommended Terms 
Community
Promoting Contract Flexibility through Trademarks 
263 
with a known company would carry a sense of the company’s image and business goals, a 
branded licensing conveys the norms and values of a community that drafted the terms of 
licenses. Thus, the trademark for the symbol represents not only the terms of the contract but 
also carries with it qualitative information about the community, i.e. the good will, just as a 





[Figure 3. The Two-Fold Structure of Branded Licensing] 
 
 
3.5. Branded IPR licenses – Practice Survey 
 
Branded IPR licensing practices may be categorized into three different types: 1. “pure” 
user-community drafted; 2. mark-holder drafted; and 3. industry association drafted. Each 
involves different levels of brand usage and may be exclusively applicable to particular 
species of IPR.  
 
3.5.1. “Pure” Community Based “Branded” Licensing – the OSI example 
 
In the “pure” community example, a pre-existing group formed for broader purposes may 
develop a shared consensus concerning certain norms about licensing, or some aspect of 
contractual exchange in which the members of the community engage. The “brand” that 
emerges may or may not be represented by a trademark, but outsiders who share similar 
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normative beliefs may adopt the licensing terms of the community group by referencing the 
group’s work. In this model, the brand is more of a byproduct of the group’s central 
activities, or a way for their members to gain control over certain usages that are crucial to 
their outlook. Eventually, general public adoption of the key terms may be possible. If that 
occurs, the branding community has in effect acted as a lobbyist or broader voice for certain 
values. 
 
This sort of branded community may suggest specific terms, or may instead specify a 
framework or set of criteria that must be met for the organization to approve a particular 
agreement drafted by outsiders and permit use of the community mark. Such an “approval” 
rather than “specification” system permits greater flexibility to the particular contracting 
parties.  
 
The “Open Source Initiative” [OSI] serves as an example of the pure community model. 
Open source licensing of computer programs has been growing steadily as an alternative 
means of distributing software. As a movement, it was originally formed around the crucial 
sentiments against distributing software in a “closed” source code. Where the source code is 
closed, the creators of the software are operating in a Permission mode. They want to control 
access to their idea, thinking that only by enclosing and selling or renting the ideas will they 
be able to ensure a return on investment. Collaborationists oppose that mentality, on grounds 
that without knowing the source code, it is much more difficult to build on the software. The 
sophistication and techniques of the software may be masked, and potentially alternative uses 
may be stifled. When both the user and producer community share a belief in open sourcing, 
the source code is disclosed or made accessible when the software products are distributed.   
 
The OSI organization was formed to standardize the usage of the term “Open” through the 
usage of a mark of approval (“OSI Approved”) to a set of licensing terms that meets the 
standards of the OSI. OSI reviews and approves license terms according to their standards. 
To bear the mark, the approved licenses need to include a certain set of conditions in the 




In addition, to use its trade mark and logo, the OSI website specifies that the user must 
                                                 
17
 http://www.opensource.org/docs/osd 
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comply with the trademark and logo usage guidelines.
18
 These guidelines aim to ensure that 
only those software licensing practices which meet the requirement of the definition of “open 
source” of OSI will be allowed formal use of the OSI logo.  
 
In the OSI example, the standardization of licensing terms is preceded by the evolution of 
community norms. Use of the OSI logo becomes an additional way of branding the open 
source community. In other words, the norm of open source licensing was achieved prior to 
the actual standardization of the terms and trademark usage policies. The brand is organically 
formed, based on community norms among the users. The specific open source licensing 
terms are simply codifications of those informal norms, and the trademark and logo usage 
guidelines enforce such codified norms.  
 
Users of open source licensing forms are often aware of the implications of using the OSI 
terms. On the other hand, the original OSI movement grew out of a common yet uncontrolled 
understanding of “openness.” The degree of “openness” was, and remains, controversial. For 
that reason, it was necessary to generate a common means to control the flow of the open 
source code programs, and to standardize the use of the phrase “open source code” when 
code was actually distributed. 
 
This necessity seems to apply not only the first generation open source code products, but 
also the second generation products. Second generation products may be a mixture of both 
open and close source code product, and if so it is important to determine how much code is 
actually subject to the open source licensing. Diverse licenses may claim to be “open,” in 
other words, but may fail to meet the original expectation of the open source community. The 
use of the certification mark is one means of OSI’s attempt to enforce and control the various 
versions of the open source licensing that are currently in use. Through standardizing core 
terms and then tying such usage to the certification mark and logo, OSI standardizes open 
source licensing through branding. Further, approval by OSI is a way of lending normative 
authority to the terms through the community, even while the specific licensing terms are 
drafted by the parties to the agreement.  
 
 
                                                 
18
 http://opensource.org/trademark-guidelines  
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3.5.2. Industry Association or Facilitator Drafted Branded Licensing 
 
Under this model, the community behind the brand maintains selective membership, and only 
members or buyers of the association’s services have access to their brand of contracts or 
licenses. Mass adoption of the terms by the public is not the intention, and may not even be 
permitted. In certain contexts, these general terms or contracts are sold as templates in the 
particular industry. The European Engineering Industries Association’s “ORGALIME” 
contracts, which pertain to tangible objects rather than IPR, are an example. In the 
engineering industry, the terms and general conditions of known and reliable industry 




 Within the IPR context, these tendencies are visible in collective IPR management, notably 
in patent pools for technological standards. Patent pooling essentially creates a community 
that has been formed purely for the purpose of cross-licensing, or to set licensing principles 
or recommendations to achieve that goal. Examples of such a closed community brand may 
be standard setting organizations such as the Organization for the Advancement of Structured 
Information Standards (OASIS) consortium,
20
 and the World Wide Web Consortium 
(W3C).
21
 Members of the Consortium participate in the standard setting activities and in 
return agree to comply with core licensing principles. OASIS, for example, requires members 
to grant licenses on Reasonable And Non-Discriminatory terms (RAND) and to use Royalty 
Free (RF) terms or other conditions.
22
 W3C similarly promotes its patent policy,
23
 and 
through its Community Contributor Licensing Agreement (CLA) imposes on its members an 




Industry association branding is similar to the OSI initiative in the sense that the brands of the 
OASIS and the W3C are closely linked with the ideology of open standards. They 
                                                 
19
 Whittaker Simon, On the Development of European Standard Contract Terms, 2.1 EUROPEAN 
REVIEW OF CONTRACT LAW 51 (2006). 
20
 The OASIS consortium is a non-profit consortium that promotes industry standards for security, 
Cloud computing, SOA, Web services, the Smart Grid, electronic publishing, emergency 
management, and other areas. https://www.oasis-open.org/standards  
21
 W3C is the World Wide Web Consortium that develops open standards to ensure the long-term 
growth of the Web and promote open standards principle. See their website for detail, www.w3c.org  
22
 For OASIS licensing requirements, see 
https://www.oasis-open.org/policies-guidelines/ipr#licensing_req at §10 et seq.  
23
 http://www.w3.org/Consortium/Patent-Policy-20040205/  
24
 http://www.w3.org/community/about/agreements/cla/  
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recommend core licensing terms and conditions for standards specifications developed under 
the Consortium. These Consortium licensing agreements depend greatly on voluntary 
adoption by the users (members) of the licensing agreement. Further, the background content 
of the standard “brand” of OASIS
25
 and W3C are known, but use of the sign is for the 
members only. However, unlike OSI, they do not have licensing terms approval process or a 
certification program. 
 
This type of “branded” licensing would not lead to a strong standardized contract, but only 
standardization of the principles to be used in drafting the licensing agreement. The brand 
represents and informs that certain licensing principles are adopted. The brand, however, 
does not fully stand in as the visually represented part of the contract. 
  
Further, these industry association practices need to be distinguished from the practices of 
facilitator drafted licensing. An example of this would be the W-CDMA (Wideband Code 
Division Multiple Access) patent pool for interface standards in 3G mobile 
telecommunication network products. The patent pool grouped together all relevant 
W-CDMA FDD standard essential patents from those companies joining the program, and 
coupled them within the licensing program. Currently the licensing program is administrated 
by Sipro Lab Telecom which provides licensing programs for telecommunications 
technologies, including “3GPP W-CDMA FDD Standard and ITU-T G.729, G.723.1, 
G.729.1 and G.711.1 recommendations for speech and audio coding”.
26
 In this case, a license 
administrator drafts the agreement and facilitates use by the IPR holders; thus licensing terms 
are indirectly standardized. They are facilitating licensing, and establish only a vehicle to 
pool the rights. Thus they fail to form the basis of a “branded” licensing practice as analyzed 
in this chapter. 
 
3.5.3. Drafter Based “Branded” Licensing – the Creative Commons Example 
 
In contrast to the pure or organic community model exemplified by OSI approved licenses, or 
the model of OASIS or W3C whereby a licensing principle rather than the terms are 
standardized, there is a third model of branded licensing. Some community or organization 
drafted licenses may strictly control the uses of the license terms by providing not simply a 
                                                 
25
 https://www.oasis-open.org/private/logos.php  
26
 http://www.sipro.com/wcdma_about.php  
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model set of terms, but also extensive legal documents that the users need to adopt. In other 
words, use of a mark signifies not simply approval of terms that may be generated by the 
particular parties, or the core licensing principles, according to the brand of the community or 
associations. Instead, the mark further entails that the parties adopt particular language of the 
branded organization and contract terms. 
  
In this model, the iconic references simplify and standardize the contracting process, but at 
the expense of level of freedom of the particularly contracting parties. Particular parties must 
adopt the texts that the organization provides, even though some level of choice may be 
maintained by the brand offering different modules of licensing terms. Regardless of the 
variety of modules available, here the brand is created so that a community can be created 
through collective usage of the branded terms. The brand forms a key core of the idea of the 
community, rather than an offshoot of other activities, and the use of the brand is crucial. 
General public adoption of the key terms may well be the explicit goal of the branded 
community.  
 
One good example of brander-drafted contracts is Creative Commons. Creative Commons is 
a movement that was first initiated by Lawrence Lessig as an explicit reaction to 
Permission-style closed and “all rights reserved” copyright licenses whereby right holders 
reserve all rights to the copyrighted contents. A license granted under this Permission model 
has an inflexible and unitary character that disenfranchises a user of the contents; users are 
relegated to the role of mere passive receiver of contents, with broad restrictions in their use 
of the work. Under such terms, creative and transformative uses that would otherwise be 
allowed under the law may be prohibited through contracts. 
 
“All rights reserved” restrictive licenses seem to reflect a fear of an uncontrolled future such 
as we have analyzed as one source of contract inflexibility. The concern is that more lenient 
licensing conditions could lead to the loss of rights and future profitable use of the works. 
The result, however, is a rigid, complex contract that reserves rights in an attempt to restrict 
or eliminate that possible future. Creative Commons starts from a more flexible premise: that 
the right holders may grant a “some rights reserved” license that protects future profitable 
commercial uses of the works for the right holders, but without the complexity of “all rights 
reserved” contracts.  
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Each Creative Commons license is explained and available in three different forms in what 
they call three layers directed at different readers – the general public (“human readable”); 
computers (“machine readable”); and the actual license terms (“lawyer readable”). Aside 
from the obvious joke that the lawyers are not human, each layer explains the same licensing 
terms in ways that are simple (“human readable”), codable (“machine readable”), or legally 
binding.  
 
Users of the license are also guided through easily understandable questionnaires that aim to 
help the users select the correct license. The current versions (3.0) of the Creative Commons 
licenses have the following features (overleaf), with shorthand information attached to each 
of them:  
 
 





The understanding that a license may be at once Collaborative and Permission-oriented forms 
the legal and normative core of Creative Commons. While acknowledging that an intellectual 
“commons” may be constructed through private licenses, normatively Creative Commons 
seeks to create a less Permission-based and more Collaborative basis for sharing copyrighted 
contents. 
 
3.6. Theory: Branded Licensing or Contracting as Movement to a “Semi-Commons” 
 
Community based branded licensing or contracting has theoretical implications for 
understanding both property and contracts. In the IPR context, branded licensing converts IP 
                                                 
27
 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/  
“(1) Attribution 3.0, 
(2) Attribution-NoDerivs 3.0 
(3) Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 
(4) Attribution-NonCommercial 3.0 
(5) Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0, and 
(6) Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0” 
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to a kind of intellectual commons that is subject to a set of entry rules. Rather than a single 
enclosure “owner” who dispenses individualized entry Permissions, and rather than a fully 
Collaboratively shared commons, branded licensing creates a subunit of community and 
commons that allows Collaborative usage, but only for the members of the community, and 
only according to particular rules.  
 
The term “commons" as used in the branded licensing context is only a metaphor. The 
resources of a branded community are not actually and legally held in a commons; rather they 
are an aggregation of private rights where the right holders choose not to exercise their rights, 
or have granted rights of use to the members of the entire community. In a strict sense, even 
the “pure community” based branded licensing cannot create a positive commons 
arrangement. A true “positive commons” would require a single and uniform right over the 
common pool of resources to be created and communally held, and where any additional use 
of the resources would thus require consent from each member of the community.
28
 Such 
individualized consent is infeasible for any large commons. But we note that in a modern 
democratic society, intellectual property law created through a legitimate legislative process 
can be understood as a sort of proxy for gathering consents from all of the members of the 
community.  
 
A “negative” commons, in contrast, would be one in which no resources are understood as 
being subject to initial commonly held entitlement. Resources are instead available to be 
captured, and then brought under private property ownership without seeking any consent or 
approval. In the intellectual property realm, a negative commons would be a regime in which 
individual intellectual property right could be claimed over all previously unclaimed 
intellectual creations and innovations. In a negative commons, there would be no such idea as 
“the public domain” where no rights may be asserted.  
 
Both positive and negative commons fail to describe accurately the commons that the 
                                                 
28
 A resource that is initially owned by no-one, so that individual use depends on no-one’s consent, is 
a “negative” commons. If ownership is shared by a community and individual use depends on the 
consent of all, that is a “positive” commons. We use the concept of positive commons as 
distinguished from negative common as it appeared first in Drahos Peter, A PHILOSOPHY OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (1996). See also Drahos Peter, Freedom and Diversity: A Defence of the 
Intellectual Commons, in Reddy P. L. Jayanthi, CREATIVE COMMONS: INTERNATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVES 50-57 (2008). For similar concepts see Benkler Yochai, The Political Economy of 
Commons, 4.3 THE EUROPEAN JOURNAL FOR THE INFORMATICS PROFESSIONAL 6 (2003). 
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branded licensing aims to promote. If positive commons is an ideal of how property regimes 
of intellectual resources should be arranged based on the original position that all knowledge 
is part of a community, then negative commons is actually a more accurate description of the 
current system of intellectual property rights.  
 
A better analogy for the commons of the branded community might be a “semi-commons:” 
the resources of a club or gated community, in which the entry fee is the agreement to use 
only a particular type of licensing. Essentially, the branded community moves consensually 
from protecting IPR strictly by Permission, to a mid-way point between Permission and 
Collaborative models. Thus it comes close to the protection of IPR through “liability rules” in 
which anyone may have access to the resource so long as they pay the property owner a form 
of compensation (which here may be advancement of the point of view or values of the 




Converting the ideal of intellectual commons into a Permission-based gated community or 
club may create both an ideological and a theoretical dilemma. An intellectual commons as a 
positive commons includes all of the community members. No community members may 
require permission from each other to use the resource, as every member of the community 
already possesses the right of use as a right holder of the commons. In contrast, any person 
who takes a resource out of the commons to create an individual right would need a consent 
from the community. By gating the community, a Permission quality is inherently added to 
the Collaborative commons, regardless of how liberally the permission is given. Thus the 
norm of property arrangement, at least to this extent, changes from positive commons to 
negative commons. Subjecting the intellectual commons to licensing requirements means that 
private rights become the norm. The subject matter under these pooled commons is, in 
principle, subject to private appropriation and any unclaimed subject matters are considered 
res nullius, which may be claimed. If the goal is the creation of non-propertized commons, 
creation of gated community falls short. It may create open access, but that access is 
nonetheless based on propertization and Permission.
30
  
                                                 
29
 Calabresi, supra note 2, applied by Reichman in Reichman Jerome H., Of Green Tulips and Legal 
Kudzu: Repackaging Rights in Subpatentable Innovation, 53 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW 1743 (2000); 
for its importance in contracting, see Merges, Robert P. Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual 
Property Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 California Law Review 1293 (1996). 
30
 Elkin-Koren Niva, What Contracts Cannot Do: The Limits of Private Ordering in Facilitating a 
Creative Commons, 74 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW 375 (2005). 
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On the other hand, since an intellectual commons or information commons presupposes the 
concept of community, creation of an IPR club as a community may realistically provide the 
precondition for creating a small scale intellectual commons that is subject to (and 
encourages) sharing. A sustainable commons regime has preconditions, one of which is 
satisfied by the gated community analogy: a tightly knit community where the boundary, use, 





Not all branded licensing “clubs” create such a community of common values. The OSI pure 
community model is the strongest candidate. This community develops well understood 
norms, and the members participate in the drafting of the terms of licensing agreements as 
well as use them. This IP club is closer to the small scale commons. The “brand” of this 
community may be controlled and well understood by the users as part of broader norms. But 
when those terms are used outside of the drafting community, those broader community 
norms may be disregarded or break down. At that point the IP club becomes exactly what it is 
– a club.  
 
The second type of branded community—the drafter based organization like Creative 
Commons--follows the opposite course of action. Since the contract terms are drafted for the 
very purpose of creating a community, it is only in the use of the terms—the “initiation” 
--that membership is created. The community is the licensing terms themselves. The only 
condition to entry is the requirement to use the terms of the IP club. No separate set of norms 
guides the behavior of the members of the community; its users (and hence members) have 
diverse various interests and motivations for being part of this community. If open source 
code is the code of ethics for the community for OSI, not all users of Creative Commons have 
common coherent norms before they start to use the license. When the license is used, 
however, a community norm of “some rights are reserved” is formed since none of the 
Creative Commons licenses allow users to reserve all aspects of copyright.  
                                                 
31 
See Hess Charlotte & Ostrom Elinor, Ideas, Artifacts, and Facilities: Information as a 
Common-pool Resource, 66 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 111 (2003). See also Reichman 
Jerome H. & Franklin Jonathan A., Privately Legislated Intellectual Property Rights: Reconciling 
Freedom of Contract with Public Good Uses of Information, 147 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA 
LAW REVIEW 875 (1999); Rose Carol M., Expanding the Choices for the Global Commons: 
Comparing Newfangled Tradable Allowance Schemes to Old-fashioned Common Property Regimes, 
10 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM 45 (1999). 
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As a result, errors in matching the contract terms with the intended usage are unavoidable, 
since the users of the terms likely had no part of their drafting. They also share no prior 
common normative understanding. Furthermore, if the mark that is associated with the 
licensing term is such that it creates a separate meaning beyond the licensing terms, this in 
turn will lead to more confusion. Just as confusion or disappointment is generated in a 
consumer when the good will that a trademark represents does not match the product quality, 
mismatching of the licensing terms and the brand will create confusion and disappointment. 
The possibility of the mismatch increases if the users do not fully comprehend the norms of 
community that the licensing agreements aim to create or respect. But there is no other source 
for such norms than the licensing terms themselves: the norms of behavior in the potential 
community can only come from the terms of licensing agreement itself.  
 
 




Branded licensing promises much of the economic efficiency gained through standardization, 
but with less of the adhesive contract qualities. Branding allows users to bargain realistically 
about the type of contract they wish to use, based on the templates. The templates provide 
reduced complexity and easy access to the materials, which serves many functions. 
Management, or even consumers, can be brought into the contracting process at a much 
higher level of engagement, while keeping transaction costs low.  
 
Sellers as well as buyers can gain from the efficiencies and choices made available by 
branding. In the case of licensing, for example, the branding tools can enable easy 
agreements about distribution of IPR materials. This is a distinct advantage, for example, to 
firms that provide services that allow users to distribute their contents on the Internet (such as 
YouTube or Flickr). Those firms benefit if the process of gaining permission and distributing 
can be so simple that even those who use mobile phones or Blackberry can easily attach 
contract terms when they share their contents and media files.  
 
Branded licensing may also transcend a traditional dilemma faced by contract drafters: the 
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tension between simplicity of terms and attention to legal detail. Although many (rightly) call 
for contracts to be written in more accessible ways, if those efforts result in overly 
simplifying the legal contents of an exchange or relationship, other problems are created. 
Simplification in contracting is therefore often viewed with caution. Although simplified 
information is useful to manage the complexities in contract terms, the fine print in contracts 
often safeguards important risks and may create significant obligations that cannot be 
ignored.  
 
There seems a genuine trend to remove unnecessary complexities from IPR licensing and 
other contract documents.
32
 In e-Commerce and mobile commerce, the need to simplify 
contract terms in a visual manner seems to be felt more urgently, both in commercial as well 
as consumer contracts.
33
 On the other hand, to function as a valid and useful form of 
contract, most contracts for innovation need to provide an adequate level of certainty for both 
parties to the contract. The beauty of branded contracting is that even though the contract is 
simplified from the user perspective, from the legal perspective it can continue to be fully 
inclusive and detailed. The documents behind the mark or sign can be comprehensive, 
although as discussed below the more sophisticated those background documents, the more 
dependent branded contracting is on maintaining trust between the drafters at the branding 
community and those who ultimately adopt the brand for use in their contracts. 
 
 
4.2. Challenges  
 
4.2.1. Evolution of Meaning 
 
One of the challenges of branded contracting lies with the fact that a “brand” may end up 
misleading the users of the licensing. As with the standardized consumer contract of 
                                                 
32 
For example, a lean contracting or a “pathclearer” approach represents some of these trends. For an 
agenda for lean contracting, see IACCM, LEAN CONTRACTING: What Might It Look Like And Why 
Does It Matter? IACCM November News Letter (2006), available online 
http://www.iaccm.com/news/contractingexcellence/?storyid=289, last accessed 28 June 2013. For a 
pathclearer approach, see, e.g., Weatherley Steven (2012), Pathclearer and Legal Risk Mapping: 
Cutting through the Contract Jungle, available online http://plc.practicallaw.com/0-519-1805, last 
accessed 28 June 2013. 
33
 Henschel Rene F. & Cleff E.B., Information requirements and consumer protection in future 
M-commerce: textual information overload or alternative regulation and communication?” 
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INTERCULTURAL INFORMATION MANAGEMENT 58 (2007). 
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adhesion, a branded licensing is meant to be used in mass and thus is directed to a general 
audience or a large subset of the public like “technology users.” A brand is represented by a 
trademark or sign that distinctively designates or represents the quality of a product or a 
service. These signs could create confusion unless users can adequately understand from the 
signs or marks what the underlying terms of usage will say or the level of protection they will 
provide.
34
 Yet marks or signs can evolve in their meaning or social perception. Through 
usage, a mark or a sign may acquire other meanings beyond their original function that may 
originally have notified or informed the consumer. Such evolution may be positive, especially 
if it represents improvements in tangible products or services. Or the evolution may be 
negative, either by degrading the quality from what was previously connoted by the brand or 
by creating legal confusion.  
 
A related problem could arise from “version control.” Different versions of licensing terms, 
for example, are inevitable in a dynamic industry like software development or in any 
industry that may need to take different user segments into account. The users of a licensing 
agreement, for example, may have different needs regarding permission for commercial uses, 
research uses, or simply for private uses made in public, like blog posts. Furthermore, users 
may be segmented into different geographical jurisdictions, especially in IP where there are 
no uniform transnational laws that govern all transactions in a given item. Some terms will 




Finally, the generalized issue of trust should be emphasized: branded licensing or contracting 
will work only as well as contracting parties trust that their basic interests are well 
represented or protected by the terms drafted by individuals associated with a particular 
brand. As suggested above, the more detailed and comprehensive those background 
documents, the more vital is the trust between the branding community and those who choose 
to use the brand. Making this even more difficult is that to be commercially viable, the brand 
will very likely employ a general disclaimer that insulates the brand from liability for deals 
that somehow go bad among users who adopt and use the branded contract. Were the brand 
                                                 
34
 See, e.g., Chang v. Virgin Mobile USA, LLC, 2009 WL 111570 (N.D.Tex. January 16, 2009) 
(Flickr photograph of a minor, using a CC Attribution license which fundamentally allows 
commercial use, but which did not address the issues of privacy of the subject of the photograph). 
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to be required to examine the efficacy of transactions, or even to monitor how the brand 
clauses are interpreted in the hands of various users, much of the economic efficiency of 
branded contracting would disappear. Hence prospective users of a brand would no doubt 
encounter a significant disclaimer from the branding community just at the time that the user 
is being asked to trust that the brand community is in solidarity with the users’ interests.   
 
How can this trust be created and preserved, especially in the many contexts in which users 
will not necessarily have any creative or formulating connection to the community that 
created the brand? As a brand develops it may go in directions that seem a betrayal to groups 
that may previously have endorsed the use of a brand and has formed the community. Norms 
that did not pre-exist start to form, creating expectations from the community of the users. 
For example, when Creative Commons issued CC license version 2, the Free Software 








Communities of every sort face the possibility that their resources will be abused. In 
response, they may follow either a Permission-based or Collaborative approach. Those who 
fear exploitation or a corruption of community resources or values through open use will feel 
a strong impulse toward Permission culture. Those who see outsider adoption of their 
community resources or outlook as opportunities for growth and development will lean 
toward Collaborative culture. Branded licensing or contracting offers the possibility of 
melding aspects of both approaches, in different mixtures that may suit different 
communities. The idea is broad enough to appeal to communities with different histories and 
goals. The terms by which a community may permit use of its trademark or sign, and of its 
underlying contract documents, should be thoughtfully considered within the community. 
 
So also, companies adopting any of these models of branded contracting need to assess 
carefully why certain pre-existing branded terms are to be preferred over others, and whether 
the norms of the branding community should be supported. Companies must remain mindful 
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that the drafters of the contract will likely not be liable for negative consequences from the 
use of their contracts. They must also remember that the contract contents will evolve 
through new versions--and possibly changing values--at the branding community. Finally, 
companies should be aware that decisions between competing brands could have symbolic, 
cultural, and goodwill effects at the adopting company, as well as legal and business 
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